1. Introduction
This essay compares and contrasts Foucault’s and Sartre’s approaches to understanding history, firstly by examining Foucault’s theory of discourse in his The Archaeology of Knowledge (1969) and Sartre’s concept of individual praxis from his Critique of Dialectical Reason (1960). While Sartre’s Critique was not a response to Foucault’s philosophy, as it was published almost a decade prior to Foucault’s Archaeology, this essay argues that Sartre’s concept of praxis presents a critique of Foucault’s theory of discourse as overly deterministic without explicit recourse to the active transformation of socio-political structures through human freedom and praxis. Consequently, this essay argues that Sartre’s concept of collective praxis (i.e. ‘fused group’) complements Foucault’s later conceptions of the ‘care of the self’ in resisting coercive ‘regimes of truth’ or oppressive systems.
In The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault (2002) argues against the traditional conception of history as continuous (p. 23). Instead, he introduces the notion of ‘systems of dispersion’ in the place of a coherent narrative (e.g. the Hegelian dialectic), redefining events as ‘things said and done’ (Schneider, 2007, p. 278) within discursive formations, which are governed by what he calls ‘rules of formation’—essentially displacing the transcendental subject with autonomous rules that govern the functioning of its thought, speech and behaviour (Foucault, 2002, p. 41; Miller, 1990, p. 116). In fact, Foucault views an understanding of history that centres around the subject as characteristic of the ‘modern episteme,’ to which Sartre belongs as the ‘last Hegelian’ (Flynn, 2014, p. 680), as Foucault moves away from a continuous account of history and aims to revolutionise how it is understood. However, one problem remains as Sartre’s dialectic of praxis does not quite fit into Foucault’s characterisation of the traditional conception of history as continuous.
Instead, Sartre’s philosophy of history is dialectical, as he resists subsuming individuals into an overarching structure, often describing his conception as a dialectic ‘with holes[1]’—denoting the ontological freedom of organic praxes (Flynn, 2014, p. 682). In particular, the dialectic between freedom and structure is evident in Sartre’s concept of the ‘practico-inert,’ which exemplifies the centrality of the free praxis—both individual and collective—in the context of human existence, insisting that the present socio-political structures are sedimentations of previous praxes (Sartre, 2004, p. 89; Flynn, 2014, p. 681).
Hence, after delving into Foucault’s ‘objective’ approach and Sartre’s ‘subjective’ approach to history, this essay further examines Foucault’s concept of ‘regimes of truth,’ which underscores his emphasis on social structures—the intertwining of power and knowledge—as producing and sustaining ‘truth’ that shapes subjectivity and limits human agency—a ‘process’ Foucault calls subjectivation. Moreover, this essay also explores Foucault’s notion of the ‘care of the self’ as a counterbalance to the coercive structures inherent in regimes of truth and elucidates why it remains incomplete, particularly by arguing how Sartre’s concept of ‘fused group’ (a collective praxis) serves as a transformative force that not only safeguards oneself from oppressive systems but also potentially reconfigures their socio-political structures so as to dissolve them entirely, thereby complementing Foucault’s ‘care of the self’ as an ethical practice while simultaneously offering a more comprehensive understanding of history.
2. Foucault’s Theory of Discourse
In The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault (2002) rejects the traditional account of history as linear and continuous and instead proposes it to be understood in terms of ‘discontinuity, rupture, threshold, limit, series, and transformation’ (p. 23). In doing so, he establishes an archaeology or account of the discursive practices—i.e. ways to think, speak, and behave—that are acceptable within a particular socio-historical context, emphasising the ‘event-like character’ of history (Schneider, 2007, p. 278) while accounting for the subject-less nature of their establishment, transformation (or change) and dissolution.
Central to Foucault’s (2014) archaeology is his characterisation of discourse, in which he lists three groups of criteria: formation, transformation or threshold, and correlation (p. 100). In brief, the criteria of formation states that discursive formations are defined by specific ‘rules of formation’ rather than a general (or universal) unifying principle (p. 100). Moreover, these rules determine the conditions under which specific objects, operations and concepts of discourse emerge, transform and interact with other objects across various discursive formations (the criteria of transformation or threshold) (p. 100). Finally, the criteria of correlation state that a discursive formation can be regarded as independent when its relationship to other types of discourses can be clearly defined so as to situate it between them and is further specifiable in terms of ‘the non-discursive context in which it operates institutions, social relations, economic and political environment)’ (p. 100).
Together, these three groups of criteria as a methodological approach replace the traditional themes of ‘totalizing history’ or overarching historical continuities (e.g. ‘unitary spirit of a time,’ Weltanschauung) in favour of a differentiated analysis that highlights ‘the gap, the distances, the oppositions, the differences, the relationships of its multiple scientific discourses’ within an episteme (Foucault, 2014, p. 101). Furthermore, concerning the episteme, Foucault writes,
[T]he episteme is not a kind of a grand underlying theory, it is a space of dispersion, it is an open field of relationships, no doubt indefinitely describable. … the episteme is not a slice of the history common to all sciences; this is a simultaneous game of specific persistences. … The episteme is not a general stage of reason; it is a complex relationship of successive shifts. (p. 101, emphasis in the original)
Thus, through such characterisations of discursive practices, as within an episteme and along with their discursive formations and corresponding rules of formations, Foucault underscores the heterogeneity of historical development while simultaneously challenging the traditional notion that human subjectivity is central in determining the course of history.
As such, in Foucault’s framework, the human subject is not an autonomous agent but a ‘function’ of the rules of discourse, constituted in the same way that a pawn is defined by the rules of chess (Miller, 1990, p. 116). Thus, instead of viewing discourse as a product of individual intention or consciousness belonging to the speaking subject, Foucault (2014) reconceptualises it as a system governed by interdependencies and rules that determine the conditions of emergence of specific utterances (énoncés) (p. 105). Therefore, his concept of discontinuity refers to a ‘game of specified transformations, different from one another… and linked together according to patterns of dependency’ (p. 105). History, then, for Foucault, is the ‘descriptive analysis and the theory of these transformations,’ grounded in the antecedent and simultaneous conditions that enable the singular emergence of events and their correlations, whether discursive or non-discursive (p. 105).
Therefore, in summary, Foucault’s theory of discourse replaces the traditional notions of continuity and the centrality of the subject as a historical agent with an ‘objective’ rule-based system that governs discursive formations. In contrast, Sartre’s conception of history is antipodal to Foucault’s systematic view and archaeological approach (Schneider, 2007, p. 277).
3. Sartre’s Individual Praxis
In Critique of Dialectical Reason, Sartre’s (2004) concept of praxis emphasises the dialectical relationship between human agency and the material environment. He writes,
[T]he organism itself as a transcendence of the multiplicity of exteriority is a univocal primary negation in that it preserves multiplicity within itself and unites itself against this multiplicity, without being able to eliminate it. Multiplicity is its danger, the constant threat to it; and, at the same time, it is its mediation with the material (p. 85)
This means that, unlike Foucault, who situates man as a cog in the discourse machine, Sartre situates the human subject as central to transforming material constraints and living conditions. Hence, Sartre asserts that history is only intelligible from the first-person perspective of the subjective experience—a ‘nothingness[2]’ (univocal primary negation) that transcends and unites with one among a multitude of its possible futures (multiplicity of exteriority) (p. 85).
Moreover, central to Sartre’s (2004) dialectic of praxis is the idea that negation is determined by and manifests through unity, as he writes, ‘negation manifests itself…as partial determination of the whole in so far as this partial determination is posited for itself.’ (p. 86). This suggests that history, for Sartre, is dialectical in the way the whole gives rise to its particulars that simultaneously oppose the totality through their particularity. Subsequently, in describing this contradiction as inherent to totalisation, he asserts that ‘it is the existence of this nothingness, which is both active (totalisation positing its moments) and passive (the whole as the presence of the future), which constitutes the first intelligible dialectical negation’ (p. 86, emphasis in the original). Hence, for Sartre, it is this tension between the particular and the whole, nothingness and totality, that determines the ‘structure of Being’ (p. 85), which conditions praxis:
On this basis [of unity shaped by praxis], a new type of negation arises, for this is a new type of totality which is both passive and unified, but which is constantly reshaping itself, either through the direct action of man or in accordance with its own laws of exteriority. (p. 87)
Additionally, this dialectic is central to Sartre’s account of human labour as the original praxis in its mediation of man with the ‘inert totality’ (material environment) (p. 89). Through labour, the human subject introduces ‘partial determinations’ (particularities) into the inert totality, transforming the environment by simultaneously constructing and disrupting its natural unity (p. 89). In summary, Sartre remarks, ‘Labour of any kind always exists only as a totalisation and a transcended contradiction.’ (p. 89).
Its [i.e. Labour’s] primary movement and its essential character are defined by a twofold contradictory transformation: the unity of the project endows the practical field with a quasi-synthetic unity, and the crucial moment of labour is that in which the organism makes itself inert (the man applies his weight to the lever, etc.) in order to transform the surrounding inertia (p. 90).
In synthesis, labour as the original praxis is a ‘negation of the negation,’ which may give rise to an ‘affirmation,’ i.e. a reconfigured structure, that opens up new possibilities in the totality. As such, praxis does not merely suffer or adapt passively to external conditions but actively renegotiates the relationship between the whole and its particulars, thereby highlighting the dialectical balance between progress and resistance within totalisation (p. 88).
Therefore, Sartre’s conception of history does not follow a linear sequence but is rather ‘open-ended’—i.e. at any time susceptible to resistance and dissolution—and is grounded in the active participation of and tension between subjectivities in the material world. Consequently, Sartre’s (2004) account of labour as original praxis that gives rise to new (socio-political) structures with its own ‘laws of exteriority’ (p. 87) complements Foucault’s account of the regularity (or autonomy) of the rules of formation of discourse while simultaneously clarifying that they remain rooted in human agency, which is significant as it makes explicit their non-deterministic nature.
4. Foucault’s Regime of Truth and Care of the Self
In contrast to Sartre, Foucault’s insistence on the systematic nature of discourse eventually leads him to conceive the notion of the ‘regimes of truth,’ further highlighting the circular relation between power and knowledge in the socio-political sphere. In a famous 1976 interview, Foucault asserts that ‘truth’ is not neutral but rather deeply political, produced, regulated and sustained through social mechanisms such as institutions (Lorenzini, 2015, pp. 2-3). Thus, prior to 1980, Foucault’s concept of ‘regimes of truth’ can be summarised as:
(1) “the types of discourse [society] harbors and causes to function as true”; (2) “the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true from false statements” and (3) “the way in which each is sanctioned”; (4) “the techniques and procedures which are valorized for obtaining truth”; (5) “the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true”. (p. 2)
As such, this concept underscores the circularity of power and knowledge: power generates truth, and truth reinforces power, creating a self-sustaining system (p. 3)—further reinforcing Foucault’s assertion that human agency is a construct of an externalised ‘rules of discourse,’ consistent with his account in The Archaeology of Knowledge.
However, post-1980, Foucault expands his horizon to reconsider subjectivity and asks: ‘Can’t there be experiences in the course of which the subject is no longer posited, in its constitutive relations, as what makes it identical with itself? Might there not be experiences in which the subject might be able to dissociate from itself, sever the relation with itself, lose its identity?’ (Flynn, 2014, p. 687)—thereby reintroducing the subject into his framework and defining the subjective experience as a ‘matrix’ of truth, power, and subjectification (or subjectivation) (p. 687). Crucially, regarding subjectivation, Foucault asserts that the Western people of his time ‘profess’ a certain yielding to truth in the following form: ‘if it is true, then I will submit; it is true, therefore I submit’ (Lorenzini, 2015, p. 5, emphasis in the original)—which he identifies as a historical-cultural problem. Thus, this logic of submission illustrates how regimes of truth sustain their authority through what Foucault calls ‘games of truth,’ in which socio-political institutions dictate the partage (split) between truth and false statements, thereby constituting subjectivation by compelling individuals to align themselves with its dictates, not merely as passive recipients but as active participants in their own self-constitution (p. 5).
Consequently, in his later works, Foucault (1997) develops the concept of the ‘care of the self’ as an ethical counterbalance to the coercive structures inherent in regimes of truth. Rooted in ancient Greek and Roman traditions, the ‘care of the self’ emphasises self-reflection, self-governance, and relational ethics as essential practices for cultivating freedom within power relations. Hence, central to this concept is the idea of knowing (connaître) oneself, i.e. to understand one’s desires that may threaten the freedom of others and one’s own (pp. 283-285). As such, Foucault’s concept of the ‘care of the self’ is intricately linked to the notion of self-mastery, and is not an isolated act of individualism but is inherently relational: ‘To take care of the self is to equip oneself with these truths: this is where ethics is linked to the game of truth.’ (p. 285).
Furthermore, by integrating the ‘care of the self’ into a broader framework of governmentality—which he defines as ‘the whole range of practices that constitute, define, organise, and instrumentalise the strategies that individuals in their freedom can use in dealing with each other’ (Foucault, 1997, p. 300)—Foucault simultaneously refines his understanding of power, resistance and freedom, thereby adding greater nuance to his concept of the regimes of truth. Firstly, power, in this sense, is understood as ‘action [(fuelled by desire)] on the action of others’ (Foucault, 1982, p. 789; 1997, p. 292). Subsequently, by highlighting how practices associated with the care of the self are culturally and historically situated[3], Foucault underscores that there will always be the freedom to practice ‘care of the self’ despite regimes of truth—practices which, although informed by one’s cultural context (and thus shaped by regimes of truth), also serve as a means to resist and respond to those very regimes. In sum, this means that, for Foucault (1997), power relations necessitate a degree of freedom on both ends, i.e. the possibility of resistance (i.e. negotiation and reversal) even in instances of domination within a regime of truth (p. 292).
Hence, in Foucault’s (1997) view, ‘[t]he idea that there could exist a state of communication that would allow games of truth to circulate freely, without any constraints or coercive effects, seems utopian’ (p. 298). Thus, he advocates for ‘care of the self’ as an effort to minimise the chance of domination within power relations. However, while this concept serves as a counterbalance to regimes of truth, the fact remains that it is primarily a personal practice and is, in the broader social context, often inadequate to address coercive regimes of truth. Therefore, Foucault’s account remains incomplete as it overlooks the collective dimension of praxis that resists oppressive systems or regimes of truth—a framework that Sartre explores in Critique of Dialectical Reason.
5. Sartre’s Fused Group
In Critique of Dialectical Reason, Sartre (2004) reflects on the nature of oppressive systems, particularly by examining capitalism as a form of praxis built upon the alienation of individual subjectivities. In Sartre’s conception, it is a classic example of what he calls ‘practico-inert,’ a historical socio-political structure sedimented by previous human praxes which at present operates ‘autonomously.’ Sartre, however, clarifies that this act of alienation is not autonomous but is instead rooted in the perpetual (subjective) act of objectifying individual subjectivities—even in self-objectification, where one views oneself from a third-person perspective—reducing individual subjects into functional components of the larger structure (as a practico-inert) (p. 747). As such, this account underscores the human origin of systemic oppression; as Sartre emphasises, ‘it is not things which are ruthless, it is men’ (p. 748). Notably, on a positive note, it also highlights how seemingly autonomous regimes, such as capitalism, remain fundamentally sustained by human agency, implying that they are still susceptible to transformation (or change) and dissolution.
Thus, while Foucault underscores how regimes of truth exert power on individuals by influencing their actions, Sartre’s existentialist perspective on the fundamental freedom of the human subject emphasises that regimes of truth cannot in themselves ‘forbid absolutely’ (Foucault, 1982, p. 789) an individual from acting out of his free choice, even when constrained by possibilities. This means that there will always remain open possibilities to act, but the problem lies in the ‘unjust’ repercussions for taking actions that are deemed unfavourable by certain oppressive regimes with their punitive mechanisms—hence, the question becomes: ‘At what cost?’. Consequently, in introducing the concept of the ‘fused group,’ Sartre (2004) highlights how multiple human subjects can come together to form a collective praxis that can effectively resist systems of oppression by reconfiguring the practico-inert—i.e. coercive socio-political structures inherent in the regimes of truth—so as to dissolve them (p. 345).
Importantly, unlike practico-inert, the fused group is constituted organically through the intentional actions of individuals who deliberately unify around a common pledge (le serment) (p. 345, p. 419). Furthermore, in rejecting the idea of collective consciousness that may apply to the fused group, Sartre insists that each member of the group is a free individual who, at any time, can choose to withdraw their pledge, thereby altering the group’s constitution and priorities (p. 422). As such, the unity and cohesion of the fused group rely heavily on the commitment of each member, which ideally shapes the individual’s identity as a constituent of the group. As Sartre writes,
[I]n each common individual, there is no principle of individuation for the act of swearing: thus the individuals are diverse but their pledges — however distinct as spatio-temporal acts — are, through everyone, the pledge, an individual act of the common individual (in that it consolidates or produces this individual). But in the common decision to swear there is a presentiment of the exigencies of differentiation; and it is precisely the unfolding of these exigencies before the pledged individual which shows him the group as a means, and therefore as an end and an object. (p. 493)
Moreover, in describing the fused group as a ‘developing (or still to be achieved) totalisation, rather than as a completed totality’ (p. 493)—due to the ever-present risks of internal threats such as the abandonment of the pledge by members of the group—Sartre characterises the fused group as having ‘reflexivity,’ a ‘quasi-objectivity’ that demands each individual member to actively reflect on their common objective or goal—in which the group only serves as a means to an end—thereby preventing the fused group from becoming a practico-inert or an oppressive system in turn (p. 493). Therefore, Sartre’s collective praxis qua fused group complements Foucault’s ethical framework of ‘care of the self’ as a counter-balance to resist regimes of truth, particularly by extending this resistance to the collective dimension, where unified subjectivities pursuing a common goal can reconfigure and dissolve oppressive socio-political structures.
6. Conclusion
In conclusion, this essay has explored the philosophy of history in Foucault and Sartre, particularly by examining their respective views on the roles of human agency and socio-political structures in understanding history. While Foucault’s early work, specifically his theory of discourse as elaborated in The Archaeology of Knowledge, decentralises the subject by replacing it with autonomous ‘rules of formation’ that govern the emergence and transformation of discursive formations, his later work reintroduces the subject through the concept of subjectivation under an evolved conception of the ‘regimes of truth’ and the ‘care of the self’—the latter of which serves as an ethical framework to resist the coercive or oppressive mechanisms of regimes of truth. However, despite this evolution, Foucault’s focus remains largely on individual resistance, leaving the collective dimensions of socio-political transformation underdeveloped.
In contrast, Sartre’s Critique of Dialectical Reason centralises human praxis as the driver of historical change. By discussing the concept of the practico-inert, Sartre demonstrates how socio-political structures, while appearing autonomous, are nonetheless sustained by human agency. In addition, his concept of the fused group illustrates how individuals can come together and unite by a common pledge that actively resists systemic oppression or regimes of truth, thereby highlighting the efficacy of transformative action through unified agency. However, as Schneider (2007) points out, despite their methodological differences—Foucault’s archaeological and genealogical analyses versus Sartre’s dialectical and hermeneutical framework—‘[b]elow the surface of opposition and total divergence of their philosophical projects lies a shared concern for what is historical’ (p. 277), as they both oppose the traditionally linear conception of history (i.e. the Hegelian dialectic). Notably, this essay has demonstrated how the later Foucault’s ‘ethical turn’—by introducing subjectivation and the ‘care of the self’—aligns very closely with Sartre’s dialectic of praxis in the Critique of Dialectical Reason, more than Foucault himself admits (p. 279).
Therefore, the two-fold argument: first, Sartre’s concept of individual praxis critiques Foucault’s theory of discourse by exposing the human origin and the role of human agency in sustaining regimes of truth (or the practico-inert, in Sartrean terms), and second, Sartre’s collective praxis qua the fused group complements and completes Foucault’s notion of the ‘care of the self’ as an ethical counterbalance to regimes of truth, particularly by introducing the collective dimension of socio-political resistance that can reconfigure or dissolve these regimes. In summary, their philosophy of history—Sartre’s dialectic of praxis, Foucault’s later concepts of the regimes of truth and the care of the self—together illustrate the intertwining of freedom and structure in the socio-political context, underscoring the centrality of individual and collective human agency in shaping the course of history.
[1] Cf. Flynn (2014): ‘These holes (trous) denote organic praxes that are ontologically free (“other-than themselves, nonself-coincidental”). This counters Foucault’s claim that the covert telos of Hegelian dialectic is identity, not difference. Whether applicable to the Hegelian dialectic or not, identity is definitely not the goal of the Sartrean. This very “inner distance” marks the Sartrean “self ” as ontologically free precisely because man is “not a self but a presence-to-self” (Sartre 1956, 440).’ (p. 682)
[2] In his magnum opus, Being and Nothingness, Sartre conceives the human subject as consciousness that is empty of content, thereby denoting it as ‘for-itself’ or ‘nothingness.’
[3] Cf. Foucault (1997): ‘I would say that if I am now interested in how the subject constitutes itself in an active fashion through practices of the self, these practices are nevertheless not something invented by the individual himself. They are models that he finds in his culture and are proposed, suggested, imposed upon him by his culture, his society, and his social group.’ (p. 291)
Bibliography
Primary Literature on Foucault
Foucault, M. (1982). The Subject and Power. In Critical Inquiry, 8(4). The University of Chicago Press. pp. 777-795.
Foucault, M. (1997). The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom. In P. Rabinow (ed.), Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, Volume I. Translated by R. Hurley. New York: The New Press, pp. 281–301.
Foucault, M. (2002). The Archaeology of Knowledge. Translated by A.M. Sheridan Smith. London: Routledge.
Foucault, M. (2014). An Archaeology of Discourse. In J. Angermuller, D. Maingueneau, and R. Wodak (eds.), The Discourse Studies Reader: Main Currents in Theory and Analysis. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, pp. 98–110.
Primary Literature on Sartre
Sartre, J.P. (2004). Critique of Dialectical Reason, Volume One. Translated by A. Sheridan-Smith. London: Verso.
Secondary Literature on Foucault
Lorenzini, D. (2015). What Is a “Regime of Truth”? In Le Foucaldien, 1(1). Available at: 10.16995/lefou.2.
Miller, J. (1990). Foucault on Discourse and Power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Secondary Literature on Sartre
Catalano, J.S. (2007). The Meaning and Truth of History: Essays in Existentialism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Flynn, T. (2010). Sartre, Foucault and the Critique of Reason. New York: Routledge.
Comparative Secondary Literature
Flynn, T. (2014). JEAN-PAUL SARTRE (1905–1980). In L. Lawlor and J. Nale (eds.), The Cambridge Foucault Lexicon. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 680–688.
Seitz, J. (2004). Sartre, Foucault, and the Subject of Philosophy’s Situation. In Philosophy and Social Criticism, 10(2), pp. 92–105.
Schneider, L. (2007). Sartre and Foucault Matching Each Other. In European Journal of Philosophy, 15(4), pp. 523–540.
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