McManus, D. (2019). On a Judgment of One’s Own: Heideggerian Authenticity, Standpoints, and All Things Considered. [Online]. 128 (512). pp. 1181–1204. Available from: https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzx045.
In this illuminating account of Heidegger’s notion of authenticity (Eigentlichkeit), McManus thoroughly explores Heidegger’s descriptions of authentic existence in Being and Time through an in-depth review of primary and secondary literature, including Heidegger’s discussion on Aristotle’s phronesis in the lectures of 1922 (‘Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection with Aristotle’) prior to the publication of Being and Time. In short, this paper shines light on both the intellectual and affective nuances of Eigentlichkeit, making it an important reading for both novice philosophers and Heidegger scholars.
§1 serves as an introduction to two models of Eigentlichkeit—the ‘standpoint’ model and the ‘all-things-considered’ judgment model (ATCJM)—that McManus explores in the paper and outlines the paper’s numerous sections. Subsequently, §2 identifies five features of the authentic as described by Heidegger in Being and Time [p. 1182]. According to Heidegger, the authentic “(1) are ‘answerable [verantwortlich]’, (2) ‘accomplish selfhood’, and (3) are—in some sense—whole” [p. 1182]. Furthermore, McManus notes that whereas Heidegger describes the inauthentic as ‘less than a whole’ or ‘fragmentary’, the authentic are characterised by (4) ‘resolution’ or more literally ‘un-closedness’ [p. 1183] and (5) openness to the ‘concrete Situation of action’ [p. 1183]. Moreover, McManus delimits the scope of his paper by mentioning that it will discuss key concepts such as das Man and temporality, but not other related concepts such as anxiety and death as they have already been and will be further discussed in some of his other papers [p. 1182].
§3 discusses the ‘standpoint model’, which encompasses multiple perspectives on authenticity, such as the adoption of a particular life-project, commitment to certain roles, standards, and values, and the owning of a narrative or life-story [p. 1183]. Although the model—as McManus acknowledges—oversimplifies some distinctions between the various perspectives, these differences are not significant for the current analysis. Essentially, the standpoint model portrays the authentic individual as one who embodies a set of norms and commitments, consistently acting in accordance with them across various contexts, even when faced with disapproval from the mainstream. On the contrary, the inauthentic is portrayed as lacking a strong sense of self-identity other than the one derived from society and is thus described as one who is dispersed into das Man (i.e. the “they”). Although the standpoint model seems to satisfy all five key characteristics described in §2, McManus later demonstrates that it is inadequate.
§4 presents a critique of the standpoint model that McManus calls the ‘closure objection’. The criticism argues that insisting on one’s standpoint goes against one of Heidegger’s central characteristics of the authentic, which is openness to the ‘concrete Situation of action’ [p. 1185]. According to its critiques, as opposed to being attached to one’s own standpoint, the authentic necessarily ‘allows his life to be appropriated for the sake of the situation’ [p. 1185], thereby displaying his ‘resolute openness to what matters in the present moment’ [p. 1185]. Pivotally, McManus correctly identifies the ‘closure objection’ as a naïve reply to the standpoint model, one which postulates a strict dichotomy between choosing a standpoint and acting in a way that the situation requires. Therefore, McManus is justified to maintain that the two are not necessarily irreconcilable, which is just what he does persuasively in §§5 to 8.
§5 clarifies that the individual is never disassociated from his own standpoint, and thus a decision to break one’s tradition (i.e. norms or commitments) as a response to a ‘concrete’ situation is authentic insofar as it is one’s own dictate or narrative [pp. 1186-7]. Subsequently, §6 introduces the ATCJM as an alternative approach to understanding Eigentlichkeit by first discussing three sets of scenarios [pp. 1187-8]:
(1) I do not pay attention to my concrete situation and do not run the risk of my supposed standpoint being disconfirmed;
(2) I pay attention to the concrete and my standpoint is confirmed;
(3) I pay attention to the concrete and my standpoint is disconfirmed.
According to the standpoint model, an individual is authentic in (2) and inauthentic in (1) and (3) [p. 1188]. However, as McManus correctly notes, this is a rather strange outcome as the possibility of a standpoint being confirmed or disconfirmed is contingent on first paying attention to the concrete situation. Furthermore, to regard (3) as inauthentic is to be at odds with Heidegger’s (1962) insistence that an openness to the possibility of ‘giving [one]self up, [thus] shatter[ing] all one’s tenaciousness to whatever existence one has reached’ (p. 308) is an essential feature of authenticity. Therefore, McManus makes a sensible suggestion to drop the outcome of a standpoint being confirmed or disconfirmed as a determinant of Eigentlichkeit, giving way to the ATCJM.
§7 provides further clarification on the difference between the standpoint model and the ATCJM. While the standpoint model allows for an ‘openness to change’ [p. 1189] regarding one’s standpoint, it views this change as a complete alteration to the entirety of one’s life project. McManus, however, fervently challenges this view as it oversimplifies the complexity of human lives. He suggests that our lives are multi-dimensional and ‘always subject to a multiplicity of conflicting demands’ [p. 1190]. Thus, McManus disagrees with the standpoint model’s idea of authenticity as selectively choosing one or two demands to commit to while rejecting others and pursuing only what is embraced [p. 1190]. Instead, in §8, he proposes that Eigentlichkeit be understood in terms of the ATCJM, which entails determining for oneself which of these obligations matter most in the immediate situation (i.e. here and now) and choosing to act accordingly based on one’s own judgment [pp. 1190-1]: ‘Through all-things-considered judgment [(hereafter ATCJ)], I make of my situation a whole and I act as a whole’ [p. 1191].
Furthermore, §9 explores the philosophical development of Eigentlichkeit by examining Heidegger’s discussions on Aristotle’s phronesis. In brief, Heidegger understands Aristotle’s phronesis as being concerned with ‘the good life in general’ [p. 1192]. Thus, the phronimos (i.e. ‘wise’) is one who (necessarily) pays attention to ‘[his] situation as the particular situation that it is’ [p. 1192] rather than assuming it to be an example of a ‘general situation’ [p. 1192]. Through phronesis (or ATCJ), the authentic individual puts himself in the position to respond to the concrete situation right in front of him, amidst a ‘constant struggle against a tendency to concealment residing at the heart of Dasein’ [p. 1192]. The significance of McManus’s discussion in this section is two-fold: first, it makes explicit a necessary condition for the ‘concreteness’ of a situation, which is one’s un-closedness to pay attention to its particularities. This, in turn, is a necessary condition for confronting the concrete situation with ‘resoluteness’, by being responsible for the decision that one makes. Consequently, second, it elucidates the individual’s relationship with both authenticity and inauthenticity as existential modalities and specifies their respective determinations.
Moreover, §10 provides a more detailed account of how the discussion on phronesis connects with answerability, selfhood and wholeness. Here, McManus makes an insightful observation by pointing out that answerability has a practical dimension in connection with others, which is the ‘immediate consequences for how others can expect me to act’ [p. 1195]. It is only through phronesis or ATCJ, that one can speak ‘with his person [mit seiner Person]’ [p. 1193] and is ‘distinctively whole’ [p. 1195], i.e. ‘[r]ather than act merely as a professor, a wife, a socialist, etc., [the authentic individual] condenses herself, one might say, in a unified overall view of her situation, which can be identified not with the view of a professor, a wife, a socialist, etc., but with her view.’ [p. 1195]—thus characterising ‘accomplished selfhood’.
In §11, McManus discusses Heidegger’s notion of guilt in relation to ATCJ by first laying down the ‘two central notions of the ATCJM’ [p. 1196]: the fact that ‘our lives are normatively multi-dimensional and the need, nonetheless, to resolve that plurality into a unity in the moment of action’ [p. 1196]. For Heidegger, every action is marked by guilt because, “as finite creatures, the ‘demands of conscience’ outstrip the ‘possibilities of action’: in any action, we leave some of the demands that our situation places upon us unmet.” [p. 1197]. This, in fact, applies to both our authentic and inauthentic existential modalities. The difference, however, is that whereas in authenticity we respond to the ‘call of conscience’—which for McManus necessarily entails ATCJ—, in inauthenticity, we are ‘lost in possibilities’ and ‘allow [these] possibilities to [‘accidentally’] thrust themselves upon [us]’ (Heidegger, 1962, p. 308, p. 308). Crucially, McManus also provides a mundane illustration that makes explicit the affective constitution of ATCJ. This is significant because it elucidates another necessary condition for the authentic characteristic of ‘resoluteness’, that is, the tenaciousness to wholeheartedly bear the burden of guilt whilst carrying out one’s chosen action. Additionally, McManus’s insistence on the need for ATCJ in authenticity aligns with Heidegger’s (1962) emphasis on the authentic as someone who ‘never loses time and always has time’ (p. 463)—thus successfully linking the ATCJM with temporality. Therefore, McManus puts forward a compelling account for understanding Eigentlichkeit as ATCJ.
§12 addresses a few potential objections to the ATCJM, an example of which is the seeming lack of ‘constancy’ (Ständigkeit) of the authentic individual that the model envisions [p. 1198]. McManus, however, addresses this concern comfortably by quoting Heidegger to identify ‘constancy’ as the “‘repetition [Wiederholung]’ [of] ‘holding-oneself-open’ [Sichfreihalten]’, ‘acting anew in every moment on the basis of the corresponding decision [entsprechenden Entschluss]’” [p. 1199]—thus illustrating ATCJ. Lastly, in §13, McManus concludes his paper by neatly summarising the advantages of understanding Eigentlichkeit in terms of the ATCJM.
All in all, McManus delivers a comprehensive analysis of Eigentlichkeit, demonstrating his formidable command of primary and secondary literature. Through the ATCJM, he elucidates both the intellectual and affective nuances of Heideggerian authenticity, thus putting forth a cogent interpretation of Eigentlichkeit. Therefore, I strongly recommend this paper as an essential reading for both novice philosophers and established Heidegger scholars.
Reference List
Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and Time. Translated from the German by J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
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