1. Introduction
This essay aims to explore Bergson’s concept of intuition in Time and Free Will, and compare it with ideas in phenomenology, particularly in Husserl and Heidegger. Section 2 provides the context for our exploration by discussing Bergson’s concept of consciousness as ‘duration’ (la durée), which is grasped by intuition, and section 3 delves into Bergson’s skepticism towards language and reflection as substitutes for intuition. In sections 4 and 5, we will examine the similarities and differences between Bergsonian intuition and Husserlian reflection, which leads to section 6, where we will explore Heidegger’s and Husserl’s phenomenological analysis of language and reflection. According to their argument, language and reflection do not distort the lived experience, nor are they contrary to intuition. Rather, they enhance the lived experience and complete it. Finally, section 7 discusses the phenomenological critiques of Bergson’s concept of intuition, and section 8 concludes the essay by summarising the key points of the phenomenological critiques and providing additional remarks on the unsatisfactory nature of Bergsonian intuition.
2. Bergson’s Concept of Consciousness as Duration
In the second chapter of Time and Free Will, Bergson (1910) introduces his idea of the multiplicity of conscious states and the concept of duration. In this chapter, he explains how the then-mainstream positive psychology imports the empiricist theory of space to understand conscious states (pp. 93-94), which he renders incompatible and irreconcilable with our experience of time. According to Bergson, this importation that perceives consciousness through spatial forms derived from the external world distorts and obscures the true nature of consciousness. His philosophical exploration aims to convince us to abandon these forms to uncover the genuine and typically concealed nature of consciousness. Bergson posits that the true character of consciousness is time itself, which he calls ‘duration’ (la durée), and which can only be perceived directly or ‘intuited’ (p. 90) rather than ‘measured’ (p. 106) as it shares no common characteristic with space. Zahavi (2010) succinctly summarises Bergson’s account of conscious states within ‘pure duration’:
[I]n pure duration, conscious states are not distinct, but united. They are characterized by a dynamical self-organization, where they melt into and permeate one another without precise outlines. In fact, on this level, there is no real difference between the persistence of one state and the transition to another state. They intermingle in such a way that we cannot tell whether they are one or several. We cannot examine or approach them from this point of view at all without altering and distorting them [(Bergson, 1910, p. 137)]. (p. 119)
For Bergson (1910), ‘pure duration’ or consciousness is the qualitative flow of time itself, which is indivisible and not quantifiable as intervals of time (pp. 105, 107). Therefore, conscious states that represent quantitative intervals have no basis in concrete time and are rather abstractions resulting from the confusion of time with space. Furthermore, Bergson asserts that consciousness as duration is a ‘dimension so unique that it cannot be grasped by means of language or through any form of intellectual cognition’ (Zahavi, 2010, p. 120), such as analysis and reason. In fact, the misconception of confusing time with space stems from our ‘erroneous tendency aided by language’ (Bergson, 1910, p. 160):
As soon as we try to give an account of a conscious state, to analyse it, this state, which is above all personal, will be resolved into impersonal elements external to one another, each of which calls up the idea of a genus and is expressed by a word [i.e. language]. But because our reason, equipped with the idea of space and the power of creating symbols, draws these multiple elements out of the whole, it does not follow that they were contained in it. For within the whole they did not occupy space and did not care to express themselves by means of symbols; they permeated and melted into one another. (p. 163)
Therefore, for Bergson, language is merely a tool that serves our societal and utilitarian needs (Lawlor, 2004, p. 25), and which abstracts consciousness and divides it into a ‘series of inner states’ (Bergson, 1910, p. 137).
3. Bergson’s Concept of Language, Reflection and Intuition
In the third chapter of Time and Free Will, Bergson (1910) further explores the nature of psychic states and their representation in consciousness, in which he distinguishes between two ways of assimilating the conscious states of other people: the dynamic way, which involves experiencing the states oneself, and the static way, which involves substituting the consciousness of these states with their intellectual symbol or idea through language (i.e. representation) (p. 186). Consequently, Bergson says, this representation in imagination is always an inadequate replacement as it eludes the distinctive nuances of perceiving consciousness directly, such as experiencing the intensity of feeling (p. 186). Furthermore, language as a whole makes us ‘operate with sharp and precise distinctions’, thereby distorting the flow or ‘processual character of our experiential life’ (Zahavi, 2010, p. 120, p. 120). Bergson (1910) writes:
The greater part of the time we live outside ourselves, hardly perceiving anything of ourselves but our own ghost, a colourless shadow which pure duration projects into homogeneous space. […] [S]tates of consciousness are processes and not things; that if we denote them each by a single word, it is for the convenience of language; that they are alive and therefore constantly changing’ (p. 196)
Furthermore, Bergson explains his ideas by using an example of how people understand a language that they are not completely fluent in. According to Bergson, the key to understanding is not just the sounds themselves, but intuition, which is the immediate grasp of the sense or meaning behind the words. Once a person intuitively grasps the ‘corresponding idea’, a ‘directing idea’ connects that understanding to specific elements or auditory images such as words, ultimately enabling the listener to repeat what the other person has said (Lawlor, 2004, p. 36). Thus, Bergson believes that understanding is not based on static generalities but rather on the singularity of the individual’s sense. Consequently, the comprehension of specific words depends on one’s own sense, and the rhythm of speech is viewed as a reflection of the individual’s rhythm. Bergson’s perspective suggests that understanding flows from the individual to others rather than from others to the individual and that language evolves from intuition rather than vice versa (p. 36).
Simply put, for Bergson (1910), language is incapable of conveying the subtleties of lived experience (p. 13), and ultimately concludes that there is ‘no common measure between mind and language’ (p. 165). Furthermore, he argues that language and analytic reflection are made possible by the faculty of reason, which is a form of intellectual cognition that immobilizes and spatializes the flow of lived experiences (Zahavi, 2010, p. 120). However, since the true nature of consciousness is that which resists conceptualisation and ‘artificial demarcations and distinctions’ (p. 120), consciousness cannot be thought but only intuited.
Although Bergson did not explicitly present intuition as an antithesis to reflection in Time and Free Will, he later asserted it in his later works, in Matter and Memory and Creative Evolution:
Intuition consists in an effort of reflection in which one ‘goes seeking experience at its source … above this decisive turn where, inflecting itself in the direction of our utility, it becomes properly human experience’ (MM 321/184). The ‘turn of experience’ is consciousness enlarged. […] [Intuition] concerns internal duration and nothing else (PM 1273/32). (Lawlor, 2004, p. 27)
In contrast to analytical reflection, which deals with abstract intellectual symbolisms, Bergsonian intuition directly grasps pure duration (Zahavi, 2010, p. 124). Moreover, Bergson went so far as to assert that intuition, duration, and consciousness are identical and equivalent to memory (Lawlor, 2004, p. 27). In brief, Bergsonian intuition refers to the immediate understanding of sense or meaning in the present moment, which is an extension of one’s entire past experiences. Therefore, according to Bergson, this concept cannot be fully expressed through language, as language is only a secondary representation of this understanding (p. 35).
4. Similarities Between Bergsonian Intuition and Husserlian Reflection
According to Zahavi (2010), Schütz frequently drew parallels between Bergson’s notion of duration and Husserl’s analysis of inner time-consciousness, even comparing Bergson’s concept of intuition with Husserlian reflection (phenomenological reduction or epoché). For Husserl,
We carry out an epoché in regard to all objective theoretical interest, all aims and activities belonging to us as objective scientists or even simply as [ordinary] people desirous of [this kind of] knowledge. Within this epoché … neither the sciences nor the scientist has disappeared for us who practice the epoché. They continue to be what they were before in any case: facts in the unified context of the pregiven life-world; except that, because of the epoché, we do not function as sharing these interests … (Crisis § 35) (Zahavi, 2010, p. 8)
Put differently, when carrying out the epoché or phenomenological reduction, Husserl puts the world ‘in brackets’ or suspends certain assumptions about the objective world as we typically assume it to be for our utilitarian purposes—for example, whether objects in themselves exist independently outside of subjectivity. Similarly, Bergson’s concept of intuition requires us to ‘[in the moment] know nothing of the theories of matter and … the theories of spirit, nothing of the discussions concerning the reality or ideality of the external world’ (Kelly, 2010, p. 8).
As Husserl puts it, ‘I am not negating this “world” as though I were a sophist; I am not doubting its factual being as though I were a skeptic; rather, I am exercising the phenomenological epoché …’ (Kelly, 2010, p. 9). In short, both Bergson and phenomenology aim to elucidate the significance of the ‘mute experiences’ in our day-to-day lives. At the same time, however, Merleau-Ponty would later identify that the intersection of phenomenology and Bergson also represents a point of divergence. Bergson’s philosophy does not seek to form a system but rather aims for ‘complete’ reflection. It strives to give voice to life —thus vitalism —and cannot be exhaustive because it seeks to return to a state of ‘complete’ experience (p. 9).
5. Differences Between Bergsonian Intuition and Husserlian Reflection
In his discussion of Bergson’s concept of duration, Lawlor (2010) explains that according to Bergson, ‘the whole is never given’ (p. 35). This idea is presented in Creative Evolution, which suggests that duration is not a whole but a series without a beginning or end. Thus, Bergsonian intuition differs from Husserlian reflection, as the latter is an intuition of a necessary and invariant epistemic structure that can be idealized (p. 35).
Intuition is not relative like a perspective, but absolute. It is absolute since intuition is in the thing–here in this preposition (en) is immanence–and yet the thing given is a composite part that extends to infinity. Extending to infinity, the whole is never given, which implies that what is potential is literally unforeseeable. Intuition is a-perspectival in Bergson because the whole can never be turned into a spectacle.’ (Lawlor, 2010, pp. 35-36)
Thus, Bergson argues that consciousness, as pure duration, cannot be understood through analysis because it is beyond conceptualisation. Any reflective or analytic attempt to intellectually grasp pure duration transforms it into a sequence of static, immobilized elements, distorting its dynamic and processual nature (Bergson, pp. 219, 229). However, throughout Time and Free Will, Bergson does exactly what he cautions against. He employs language and concepts to express and elucidate the nature of consciousness that, on his own account is inexpressible (Zahavi, 2010, p. 124). At the same time, Bergson (1910) himself acknowledges the problem and appears to have reached an impasse when he admits to transgressing his own principles by introducing certain ideas that isolate and externalize conscious states in relation to pure duration:
Thus I said that several conscious states are organized into a whole, permeate one another, gradually gain a richer content, and might thus give any one ignorant of space the feeling of pure duration; but the very use of the word “several”; shows that I had already isolated these states, externalized them in relation to one another, and, in a word, set them side by side; thus, by the very language which I was compelled to use, I betrayed the deeply ingrained habit of setting out time in space. (p. 122)
Although Bergson was aware of the contradiction, he proceeded to defend his position by simply reiterating that pure duration is not translatable into words (i.e. via language), which is tautological and thus unconvincing. In contrast, Husserl approaches the phenomenon of language positively:
Linguistic discussions are certainly among the philosophically indispensable preparations for the building of pure logic; only by their aid can the true objects of logical research – and, following thereon, the essential species and differentiae of such objects – be refined to a clarity that excludes all misunderstanding. We are not here concerned with grammatical discussions, empirically conceived and related to some historically given language: we are concerned with discussions of a most general sort which cover the wider sphere of an objective theory of knowledge and, closely linked with this last, the pure phenomenology of the experiences of thinking and knowing. […] This phenomenology must bring to pure expression, must describe in terms of their essential concepts and their governing formulae of essence, the essences which directly make themselves known in intuition, and the connections which have their roots purely in such essences.[(E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, II/1)] (Zahavi, 2010, p. 125)
In other words, Husserl believes that while language is a contingent phenomenon, it is an essential element that enables consciousness to articulate and express itself in accordance with its own meaning.
6. Phenomenological Analysis of Language and Reflection
Aligning himself with Husserl, Heidegger asks of Bergson,
[I]s it really true that all language is objectifying, and that all concepts inevitably fragment a hitherto unfragmented totality? Is it really true that any description will always be foreign to that which is given? For Heidegger, experiential life is not mute, chaotic and inexpressible. Rather, experiential life is imbued with meaning, is intentionally structured, has an inner articulation and rationality and is comprehensible because it always spontaneously expresses itself; because experiencing is itself a preliminary form of understanding, it is itself what might be called a pre-understanding. (Zahavi, 2010, p. 125)
Essentially, Heidegger suggests that there is a complex relationship between experience, expression (i.e. language), and understanding, such that they are not dissociable from one another. In contrast to Bergson, Heidegger argues that our experiential life can be articulated and conceptualised in a way that is intrinsic to life itself, rather than being imposed arbitrarily from outside. A genuine phenomenological description does not violate or attempt to impose an external systematic structure on life; instead, it is rooted in and motivated by lived experience (Zahavi, 2010, p. 125).
The categories are nothing invented, no ‘framework’ or independent society of logical schemata; they are rather in an originary fashion in life itself of life; of life, in order to ‘cultivate’ it. They have their own mode of access which, however, is not such as would be foreign to life itself, imposed upon it arbitrarily from without, rather it is just the eminent way in which life comes to itself. [(Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristotele)] (Zahavi, 2010, p. 125)
Consequently, phenomenologists like Zahavi have raised concerns about whether Bergson’s perspective on conceptualisation and language is too restrictive. According to Zahavi (2010), Bergson may have underestimated the ‘protean character’ of language, whose multiplicity has the ability to articulate the subjective without compromising on its qualitative expression (p. 126). Subsequently, he demonstrates this by examining the structure of different types of experiences, particularly perceptual experiences and the experience of pain. Zahavi points out that while it is clear to distinguish the perceptual experience from the object of perception in cases like seeing the moon or hearing a violin, it is not as straightforward to make the same distinction when it comes to the experience of pain. Rather, he suggests that attributing a subject-object structure to the experience of pain would be a serious mistake (p. 126). Therefore, Zahavi concludes that Bergson is correct in asserting that language can deceive us, but also points out that it enables us to identify, articulate, and criticise the error in question (p. 126).
There is indeed an irreducible difference between reading about the Aurora Borealis and seeing and experiencing it in all its splendor, but one can concede this without endorsing the idea that language rather than pointing us towards the phenomenon in question consistently points away from it, which seems to be Bergson’s view. … Finally, while accepting the irreducibility and superabundance of intuition one should not overlook that there are forms of experience which rather than being deformed or corrupted by language are made possible by it. (Zahavi, 2010, p. 126)
7. Phenomenological Critiques of Bergson’s Concept of Intuition
Bergson has often been criticised by phenomenologists for his inconsistent use of terminology. At times, he uses the terms ‘reflection’ and ‘introspection’ interchangeably (Bergson, 1910, p. 233), while at other times, he emphasizes their difference and states that reflective consciousness ‘delights in clean-cut distinctions, which are easily expressed in words, and in things with well-defined outlines, like those which are perceived in space’ (p. 9), which renders reflective consciousness incapable of revealing the true nature of consciousness (Zahavi, 2010, p. 127). Furthermore, Bergson fails to distinguish between different forms of reflection, which could have resolved the inconsistency (p. 127). Additionally, he does not explain why the introspection he prefers, aimed at making us aware of something we typically overlook due to our absorption in the external world, does not essentially amount to a form of reflection (p. 127).
In fact, Husserl argued that any skeptical claim suggesting that reflection distorts lived experiences and makes them completely elusive is self-refuting. This is because making such a claim presupposes knowledge of those same lived experiences, which can only be obtained through reflection (p. 127). However, Husserl acknowledged that reflection does not simply replicate the original experience but transforms or alters it. Otherwise, there would be no need for reflection (p. 127).
In a passage from Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins, Husserl described this transformation in more detail. He wrote that the experience to which we turn attentively in reflection acquires a new mode of being; it becomes accentuated (herausgehoben). He argued that this accentuation is nothing other than its being-grasped. Husserl also spoke of reflection as a process that discloses, disentangles, explicates and articulates all those components and structures that were implicitly contained in the pre-reflective experience. (Zahavi, 2010, p. 127)
The key point to note is that reflection does not necessarily impose an outside view on an experience. In fact, such an ‘outside’ is found within the experience itself. Thus, instead of distorting the experience, reflection can actually enhance and complete it. According to Husserl, reflection facilitates the naïve experience to articulate its own sense. Rather than adding new distorting elements, reflection can, at best, emphasise the existing structures within the lived experience. Therefore, the concern that reflection is unable to achieve true subjectivity seems unwarranted (Zahavi, 2010, p. 127).
Furthermore, as Heidegger notes, Bergson has failed to discern the necessary interplay between experience, expression (i.e. language), and understanding (Zahavi, 2010, p. 125). For Heidegger, understanding is not a form of cognition but a prerequisite for all cognitive processes; it serves as the foundation from which thought, conceptualisation and explanation emerge (Akiñcano, 2019, p. 30). As human beings, our existence is intertwined with our understanding of the world and our place within it. We understand the world through the lens of our own projects, needs, and intentions, while simultaneously understanding ourselves within the context of the world we inhabit. Therefore, understanding is a mode of being-in-the-world (p. 31). Secondly, to Husserl’s point, the aspect of articulation in reflection goes hand-in-hand with Heidegger’s understanding of the phenomenon of ‘interpretation’, which develops the naïve experience to articulate its own sense. In summary, Bergson failed to comprehend how his concept of intuition as the direct grasping of sense rests on the hermeneutic circle between understanding and interpretation.
[F]or Heidegger, ‘understanding’ is not an activity but the structure which makes any kind of activity possible. … Interpretation is the development, the making explicit, the opening out, the unfolding of the of the understanding which we are always already in. … We always already understand the situation we are in and interpretation is the working out of possibilities projected in this existential understanding. This means that there is no such thing as a presuppositionless interpretation. There is no interpretation without an understanding that anticipates it. (Akiñcano, 2019, pp. 32-33)
Therefore, according to Husserl and Heidegger, although reflection is constrained by the naïve experience of pre-reflection, it is not a mere reproduction of the lived experience but rather one that enhances it, which is what makes it cognitively valuable (Zahavi, 2010, p. 128).
8. Conclusion
In this essay, we have explored Bergson’s concept of intuition in his book Time and Free Will and examined its limitations by reviewing the phenomenological analysis of language and reflection. Firstly, Heidegger and Husserl argue that Bergson’s view on language and reflection, which he regards as always foreign to experience, is too narrow. They contend that language and reflection can articulate subjective experiences without compromising their qualitative expression. Therefore, far from distorting the lived experience, language and reflection serve to enhance and complete it. Furthermore, phenomenologists have criticised Bergson’s inconsistent use of terminology, particularly the interchangeable use of ‘reflection’ and ‘introspection’. Additionally, they have pointed out the flaws in Bergson’s concept of intuition, such as the lack of distinction between different forms of reflection and the failure to explain why the preferred introspection does not necessarily amount to a form of reflection that he condemns.
Additionally, Bergson’s account of intuition is unsatisfactory because he primarily describes it in negative terms, emphasising what it is not (Zahavi, 2010, p. 128). In contrast, Husserl offers methodological steps on how ‘true’ (i.e. transcendental) reflection can be achieved (p. 128), avoiding the pitfalls of language and instead utilising it to enhance and complete the experience in question. Therefore, Bergson’s reluctance to offer such guidance makes his concept of intuition seem like a mystification. Finally, given Bergson’s view on language, it is difficult to imagine how he can come up with a satisfying account of intersubjectivity (p. 129).
Reference List
Akiñcano, B. (2019). With the Right Understanding: Phenomenological Explorations of the Pāli Suttas. The Netherlands: Path Press Publications.
Bergson, H. (1910). Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness. Translated from the French by F.L. Pogson. London: George Alwin & Unwin Ltd.
Kelly, M.R. (2010). Introduction: Bergson’s Phenomenological Reception: the Spirit of a Dialogue of Self-Resistance. Bergson and Phenomenology. M. R. Kelly (ed.). [Online]. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. Available from: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230282995_1.
Lawlor, L. (2004). What Immanence? What Transcendence? The Prioritization of Intuition Over Language in Bergson. [Online]. 35 (1). p.pp. 24–41. Available from: https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2004.11007420.
Lawlor, L. (2010). Intuition and Duration: an Introduction to Bergson’s ‘Introduction to Metaphysics’. Bergson and Phenomenology. M. R. Kelly (ed.). [Online]. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. Available from: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230282995_2.
Zahavi, D. (2010). Life, Thinking and Phenomenology in the Early Bergson. Bergson and Phenomenology. M. R. Kelly (ed.). [Online]. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. Available from: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230282995_7.
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