(Review) The A Priori: Merleau-Ponty’s ‘New Definition’

Shahid, S. (2022). ‘The A Priori: Merleau-Ponty’s ‘New Definition’’, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 30(4), pp. 399-419. Available at: 10.1080/09672559.2022.2108102.

Introduction

Sidra Shahid begins her article by quoting Merleau-Ponty in his magnum opus, Phenomenology of Perception, on his claim of having pronounced a ‘new definition of the a priori’ [p. 399]. She then swiftly introduces the reader to the prevailing problem regarding its interpretation, which she maintains is contended by two antagonistic yet dominant schools of thought, namely, the naturalist and the Kantian [p. 399]. Having delivered concise synopses of their respective viewpoints, the author tactfully highlights the repercussions of such interpretations [pp. 399-400] and refers her reader to Merleau-Ponty’s account of ‘radical reflection’ [p. 400] in her appeal to an unbiased reading of the late French philosopher’s conception of the a priori, which she insists is profoundly nuanced and distinctive. In her introduction to the article, Shahid intentionally cuts out much jargon while providing sufficient depth, shrewdly preparing her reader to engage with the primary material.

In this journal review, I shall focus on critically examining the author’s treatment of each interpretation, starting with the naturalist and then the Kantian, in the sequence the author laid out for her reader. While assessing the author’s critique of the naturalist interpretation should pose minimal difficulty, given the verbatims from Merleau-Ponty’s work that makes the task straightforward, the author’s critique of the Kantian interpretation is most delicate and percipient. Therefore, to assist the reader in assessing the validity of the author’s rebuttal against the Kantian interpretation and to subsequently encourage the reader to seriously consider the author’s interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the a priori, I will draw parallel to Landes’s (2015) comparative essay on ‘sensibility’ and ‘understanding’ in Kant and Merleau-Ponty, whose analogous discussion and authoritative voice could lend support to comprehend the significance of Shahid’s work. Lastly, I shall conclude my review by briefly summarising and evaluating the author’s interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the a priori.

Critique of the Naturalist Interpretation

Following the introduction of her article, Shahid traces Husserl’s influence on Merleau-Ponty in having attempted to address the problem raised by the former in The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology [p. 400] whilst shining a spotlight on the ‘putative tension’ between the empirical (i.e. naturalist) and phenomenological accounts of experience [p. 401], a recurring theme throughout Merleau-Ponty’s work in ‘Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man’ [pp. 400-1]. She ascribes the naturalist misunderstanding about Merleau-Ponty’s “rejection of the a priori” owing to his assertion that “there is a ‘fundamental homogeneity’ between the sciences and phenomenology” through convergent methods that unify them [p. 401].

Consequently, the author proposes three hypotheses for Merleau-Ponty’s apprehension of the a priori given the comment, inviting the reader to supply their own assessments to determine the most plausible alternative. The first hypothesis reaffirms the naturalist claim of Merleau-Ponty’s dismissal of the a priori in favour of empirical investigation and method, which the author considers to be a dubious interpretation as it disregards his reputed commitment to apriority in his phenomenology [p. 401]. Alternatively, the second hypothesis latches onto Merleau-Ponty’s presumed commitment to apriority and interprets his remark as converging on the basis of the a priori [p. 401], which is the author’s chosen interpretation, whereas a third hypothesis suggests Merleau-Ponty’s desertion of both a priori and a posteriori in pursuance of a new philosophical exploration, which the author considers to be a far-reaching proposition without well-supported evidence [p. 401].

Through such considerations, Shahid displays exceptional analytical rigour with an impartial eye on the subject matter. Furthermore, in subsequently bringing to light the broader context in which the statement about ‘convergence’ is situated, i.e. transcendental phenomenology [p. 401], she reveals to the reader the ‘common method’ to which Merleau-Ponty refers:

Known as ‘eidetic insight’ or ‘eidetic viewing’ (Husserl 1983, §3 8), Wesensschau is a method through which the a priori essences of phenomena, the structures of experiences, can be ‘read’ or apprehended (Moran and Cohen 2012, 91; Drummond 2007, 64). We can also think of these essences as coincidences, features that are common to experiences of a certain kind without which the experiences in question would cease to be experiences of that particular kind (Husserl 1973, 343–344). What makes Wesensschau a priori is the fact that it delivers the structure or the essential configuration of experiences (341). [p. 402]

Pivotally, in citing Merleau-Ponty’s account of the derivative nature of empirical principles upon the apriority of Wesensschau [pp. 403-4] as determined by the metaphysical necessity of the body’s original and fixed perspective on the world [p. 405], the author justifiably puts to rest the empirical exegesis once and for all. In concluding the first section of her article, Shahid rightly points out Merleau-Ponty’s allusion to the naturalist failure to acknowledge their reliance on a priori insight [p. 405].

Critique of the Kantian Interpretation

Following the strong refutation of the naturalist interpretation, Shahid turns her attention to the traditional Kantian conception of the a priori and declares that Merleau-Ponty ‘has not left it untouched’ [p. 405]. She then presents the reader with the crux of the Kantian conception, stating:

Kant’s transcendental a priori is ‘pure,’ absolutely independent of experience, universal, necessary, and a condition for the possibility of experience and knowledge (Kant 1998, 137; B3-4). Furthermore, the genesis of the a priori is subjective; it is ‘what our own cognitive faculty [. . .] provides of itself’ (CPR B1-2). The subjective genesis of the a priori is entangled with Kant’s transcendental idealism. Kant’s Copernican Revolution, which sits at the heart of his transcendental idealist program, establishes the subject’s a priori modes of cognition as conditions for the possibility of cognition (1998, 110; Bxvi-xvii). [pp. 405-6]

In providing this summary, the author points the reader to Kant’s two fundamental presuppositions: first, the experience or phenomenal existence is a representation of noumenal existence, and second, the world is unilaterally constituted by the subject through the a priori modes of cognition [p. 406]. According to Shahid, it is in reference to this second axiom that proponents of the Kantian interpretation (i.e. Gardner) insist on being alluded to by Merleau-Ponty in his phenomenological conception of ‘the body’s permanent or fixed perspective’ as a metaphysical necessity [p. 408]. Furthermore, to assess the congruence of this claim, Shahid proposes to explore Kant’s two arguments on space to which the Kantian camp refers and evaluate them against the backdrop of Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the body:

If we export the general framework of these two arguments from the Transcendental Aesthetic to Merleau-Ponty’s arguments for the body’s permanent perspective, then we are committed to the following two claims: first, embodiment (the body’s permanent perspective) cannot be derived from factual situations, but factual situations presuppose embodiment. Second, embodiment can be experienced without factual situations, but factual situations cannot be represented without embodiment. [p. 408]

Subsequently, the author provides two counterarguments against the above formulation: complicity and situatedness [p. 409]. First, the counterargument concerning complicity describes the reciprocal relationship between the subject and the world [p. 409], which states that even if factual situations presuppose embodiment, for embodiment to be, it necessarily requires a factual situation in general as its counterpart. Consequently, Shahid rightly underlines Merleau-Ponty’s portrayal of the subject as being ‘embedded in the world’ [p. 409] rather than being the constitutive power that gives rise to the world through its a priori modes of cognition, and this variance with Kant’s first axiom of the a priori at once negates the Kantian interpretive claim. Second, the counterargument concerning Merleau-Ponty’s account of the situatedness of the body more explicitly refutes the Kantian conception of the asymmetric constitution of the world by the subject [p. 409], instead of which the author emphasises Merleau-Ponty’s notion of entanglement between the subject and the world [p. 410]. As such, Shahid’s incisive critique of the Kantian interpretation complements Landes’s (2015) article by making explicit what Landes meant when he wrote:

As such, [Merleau-Ponty] embraces the notion of a “transcendental attitude” while rejecting the notion of a “transcendental philosophy” that would be built upon the division of sensibility and the understanding. … Sensibility and understanding cannot be divided on pain of destroying the very structures of human experience and precisely because understanding is not a pure activity independent of its particular dialectical embodiment. (p. 340).

Conclusion

Having addressed the naturalist and Kantian interpretations and denoting them as fundamentally misinformed, Shahid draws the reader’s attention to Merleau-Ponty’s account of ‘radical reflection’ [p. 411]. In citing Merleau-Ponty’s quotation of Husserl, the author suggests that the central thesis of ‘radical reflection’ is that there is a passive synthesis of the experience as it is lived or in pre-reflection [pp. 412-13], which she interprets as an appeal to understanding the a priori (and the a posteriori) in terms of facticity and contingency. This interpretation is consistent with and clarifies Landes’s (2015) remark on Merleau-Ponty’s view of Kant’s “transcendental philosophy” when he wrote: ‘[F]or Merleau-Ponty, a properly phenomenological-transcendental Aesthetic merges with the Analytic, so long as the Analytic is simultaneously rewritten from within this new Aesthetic.’ (p. 337). Most crucially, Shahid provides the reader with Merleau-Ponty’s own definition of the a priori [p. 415]:

The a priori is the fact as understood, made explicit, and followed through into all of the consequences of its tacit logic: the a posteriori is the isolated and implicit fact. (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 230)

Considering the above enigmatic expression and Landes’s (2015) interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the experience as ‘meaning-generating gestures in context’ rather than being rooted in principles of constitution (p. 341), Shahid’s perspicuous encapsulation of Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the a priori as a ‘mode of articulating the meaning and sense of experience’ (emphasis in original) in the figure-background structure of experience [pp. 415-16] is ingenious and deserving of a standing ovation. All in all, this article significantly contributes to the field of transcendental phenomenology by elucidating the distinctive nuances of Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the a priori, and I highly recommend it as a reading companion to Merleau-Ponty’s work.

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Reference List

Landes, D.A. (2015). Kant and Merleau-Ponty and the Critique of Reason; Between Sensibility and Understanding: [Online]. 29 (3). p.pp. 335–345. Available from: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5325/jspecphil.29.3.0335.

Merleau-Ponty, M. (2012). Phenomenology of Perception. Translated from the French by D. A. Landes. London: Routledge.